computational equivalence
AR$^2$: Adversarial Reinforcement Learning for Abstract Reasoning in Large Language Models
Yeh, Cheng-Kai, Lee, Hsing-Wang, Kuo, Chung-Hung, Huang, Hen-Hsen
Abstraction--the ability to recognize and distill essential computational patterns from complex problem statements--is a foundational skill in computer science, critical both for human problem-solvers and coding-oriented large language models (LLMs). Despite recent advances in training LLMs for code generation using reinforcement learning (RL), most existing approaches focus primarily on superficial pattern recognition, overlooking explicit training for abstraction. In this study, we propose AR$^2$ (Adversarial Reinforcement Learning for Abstract Reasoning), a novel framework explicitly designed to enhance the abstraction abilities of LLMs. AR$^2$ employs a teacher model to transform kernel problems into narrative-rich, challenging descriptions without changing their fundamental logic. Simultaneously, a student coding model is trained to solve these complex narrative problems by extracting their underlying computational kernels. Experimental results demonstrate that AR$^2$ substantially improves the student model's accuracy on previously unseen, challenging programming tasks, underscoring abstraction as a key skill for enhancing LLM generalization.
Computational Equivalence of Fixed Points and No Regret Algorithms, and Convergence to Equilibria
We study the relation between notions of game-theoretic equilibria which are based on stability under a set of deviations, and empirical equilibria which are reached by rational players. Rational players are modelled by players using no regret algorithms, which guarantee that their payoff in the long run is almost as much as the most they could hope to achieve by consistently deviating from the algorithm's suggested action. We show that for a given set of deviations over the strategy set of a player, it is possible to efficiently approximate fixed points of a given deviation if and only if there exist efficient no regret algorithms resistant to the deviations. Further, we show that if all players use a no regret algorithm, then the empirical distribution of their plays converges to an equilibrium.